The Syrian Lebanese relations are progressing and producing dividents, as they should. Hariri's clear statement in an interview with al Sharq al Awsat this week exonerating Syria; saying that Syria was wrongly accused in his fathers assasination in 2004, will only advance the bilateral relations further.
Syria's foreign policy towards Lebanon had adjusted to the Syrian military withdrawal five years ago in record time and was able to utilize Lebanese factionalism to turn around key Lebanese players. Aun, Jumblat and Hariri are but some of Lebanese officials who admitted a fundamental geopolitical reality: Syria can be a strong Lebanese ally in the region.
The Economic and trade relations between the two countries are vital, while Syria was able to redirect its flow of hard currency after 2005 by improving its own finacial infrastructer, especially the private one, Lebanon was and is still reliant on open boarders with Syria. While Lebanon has strong political leverage and economic linkeges with western countries, Syria is the strong man in the neighborhood. Both countries might have finally come to terms with their own strengths and how they can be best utilizied for the benefit and interests of both countries.
In addition, Syria recieved its first international financial rating, by Capital Intelligence which is based in Cyprys but owns a subsidiary in Lebanon. This rating of (BB minus) of Syria's foreign credit profile is important as it highlights Syria's strong solvency and liquidity indicators, hence Syria's commitment to economic reform. The usual weaknesses of political risk and underdeveloped financiall system are still relavent, but achieving this rating is a step forward for Syria's economic developments
It has been a good week for Syria..Looking forward to many more to come.
Friday, September 10, 2010
Sunday, September 5, 2010
Syria’s Involvement in Palestinian Affairs: An Inavitable Role
As expected, 11 Palestinian factions in addition to Hamas have announced, from Damascus, their boycott of current peace negotiations between PNA's Mahmoud Abbas and Natenyahu, predicting its doom. During the first round of negotiations, that ended last week in Washington, there was an increase of inflamed rhetoric in Syrian and Iranian newspapers concerning "disgrace" and "loss of the remainder of Palestinian rights" in these negotiations. While most Arab countries view these latest negotiations with some optimism, Syria positioned itself again on a particular platform , closely resembling that of Iran and Hezbollah. The question becomes: How much of Syria's negative reaction to the negotiations is to contradict and downsize Egypt? How much of it is a reaction to the pressure exercised by the Lebanese authority against Palestinian arms in Lebanon (Ahmad Jibreel faction)? How much is to reassert the value of Syria's role in "any" peace negotiations in the region? And how much of Syria's position is involuntary?
All those factions that decry the illegitimacy of Abbas's claim that he is representing the Palestinian people, carry a political weight. This political weight is managed by Syria. Palestinian personel, their whereabouts and contacts, is closely monitored in Damascus. One can safely assume that the timing and the content of Mishaal's announcements from Damascus are thoroughly discussed between Syrian and Palestinian officials.
Characterizing Syria's involvement in Palestinian affairs thru Hamas and others, as a political card in Syria's hand, is a gross understatement. For one, it leads to the false assumption that this relation can be dismanteld given that the appropriate price can be offored to Syria. The other false assumption would be that one can isolate Syria's role in Palestinian affairs from Syria's interest in a malleable Lebanon and Syria's interest in a friendly Iraq.
Declaring the defense of "Arab Rights" as Syria has done over the past 40 years, has created an expectation parameter, noticable and measured by all the politically relavent groups in Syria. This parameter shaped Syria's proclaimed role in the region as the defender of Palestinian rights of return and land. This parameter is at the same time independent from any pragmatism expressed by one Syrian official or another. No one, in the current Syrian political configuration can overide or undermine the interlocked relation between Syria and the proclaimed Palestinian and Arab rights, as it has defined and informed Syrian foreign policy for over 40 years.
Syria was able to manage its involvement in Palestinian affairs, especially after Arafat's death. Syria extended its perspective on Palestinian concerns to third parties like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Iran and Turkey in the last 10 years. Syria kept its pressure on Egypt with regards to the terms of a Palestinian - Palestinian reconciliation (The Egyptian Paper 2010).
In short, 400,000 Palestinian refugees residing in Syria do affect Syria's position from the peace negotiations. Palestinian militants in Syria and Lebanon, not represented in the peace negotiations, do affect Syria's position from the peace negotiations. Syria's strategic allience with Iran has a Palestinian focal point, and hence the congruence with the Iranian position from the negotiations is vital. Syria's own definition of its "Defense of Arab Rights", which created Syria's regional role in 1970s, and is now an independent ligitimacy parameter, affects Syria's position from the negotiations. As one Syrian official said: "even if we wanted to disengage from Palestinian affairs..Palestinian affairs will not disengage the Syrians".
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Syria: How does one Calculate the Legitimacy of a Regional Role?
Syria’s role in facilitating the Madrid peace talks, in 1991, gave the “Ok” to other Arab countries to imagine and work on a new era in the region. The prospect of an Israeli Syrian peace agreement between 1993 and 1996 opened up channels to various negotiations, treaties, and dialogue between Israel and most Arab countries in the 1990s. What this period 1993-1996 missed was an actual realization of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Oslo I and II in addition to the Israel- Jordon 1994 peace agreement, bypassed Syria, and complicated its negotiations with Israel. The start of the Syrian Israeli peace talks gave the rest of the Arab countries a strategic opening to come to friendlier understandings with Israel , all the while the Syrian peace track was lingering and dragging without any tangible results until the direct peace talks ended in 1996.
Many analysts concerned themselves with “why” the negotiations derailed between Israel and Syria in 1996. There are many contradicting and politicized interpretations, but one can easily extract a common theme of factors, namely: withdrawal concerns vs. security concerns, the distinct Syrian negotiating style and persistence on the 1967 line, the effect of Peres and Rabin’s rivalry, the Israeli election and public opinion, the Republican hold on the house and senate in 1994, the role of the Golan Lobby. Rabin’s assassination and many more factors contributed to the dead end reached by both parties.
Fast forward to 2010, The Israeli scene has changed, the right and conservatives have an upper hand in making or breaking coalitions, now more than ever. Israeli politicians are bound to fragile political alignments that can only play into the hands of the right in Israel. The question becomes: How much does a promise of a political opening for peace actually weigh nowadays in Israel?? Because of the fear of being scrutinized as “giving in” or selling out on Israeli security, can any Israeli politician afford to talk about peace, career wise? If a start of a peace talk with Syria, opened up Israel’s potential in the region in the 1990s which quickly faded after 1996, how can Israel calculate a normalization of relations of some sort in this region without addressing the Syrian equation head on?
If the interpretation of Israel’s position and military might in the region coincides with Ambassador Yoram Ettinger’s future vision for Israel, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3851844,00.html , then one can find a latitude of excuses for Syria’s regional maneuvering since 2000. The strategic creativity of Syria’s foreign policy conduct, given economic and political isolation, has produced a favorable regional outcome for Syria. Hezbollah political accommodation in Lebanon, friendly Iraq, strategic and economic relations with Iran, good relations with Turkey. Regional realities and Syria’s carefully crafted web of interests can not be erased by military threats, those threats have emboldened and tightened the regional net effect in Syria’s favor. So how can one calculate the legitimacy of a regional role?...definatly not in threatening words, but based on outcome.
Many analysts concerned themselves with “why” the negotiations derailed between Israel and Syria in 1996. There are many contradicting and politicized interpretations, but one can easily extract a common theme of factors, namely: withdrawal concerns vs. security concerns, the distinct Syrian negotiating style and persistence on the 1967 line, the effect of Peres and Rabin’s rivalry, the Israeli election and public opinion, the Republican hold on the house and senate in 1994, the role of the Golan Lobby. Rabin’s assassination and many more factors contributed to the dead end reached by both parties.
Fast forward to 2010, The Israeli scene has changed, the right and conservatives have an upper hand in making or breaking coalitions, now more than ever. Israeli politicians are bound to fragile political alignments that can only play into the hands of the right in Israel. The question becomes: How much does a promise of a political opening for peace actually weigh nowadays in Israel?? Because of the fear of being scrutinized as “giving in” or selling out on Israeli security, can any Israeli politician afford to talk about peace, career wise? If a start of a peace talk with Syria, opened up Israel’s potential in the region in the 1990s which quickly faded after 1996, how can Israel calculate a normalization of relations of some sort in this region without addressing the Syrian equation head on?
If the interpretation of Israel’s position and military might in the region coincides with Ambassador Yoram Ettinger’s future vision for Israel, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3851844,00.html , then one can find a latitude of excuses for Syria’s regional maneuvering since 2000. The strategic creativity of Syria’s foreign policy conduct, given economic and political isolation, has produced a favorable regional outcome for Syria. Hezbollah political accommodation in Lebanon, friendly Iraq, strategic and economic relations with Iran, good relations with Turkey. Regional realities and Syria’s carefully crafted web of interests can not be erased by military threats, those threats have emboldened and tightened the regional net effect in Syria’s favor. So how can one calculate the legitimacy of a regional role?...definatly not in threatening words, but based on outcome.
Friday, February 26, 2010
Iran and Syria managing the "New Middle East"
From an American perspective, there is something odd about Syria's foreign policy conduct, especially after William Burns announced, on Feb.17th in Damascus, that Robert Ford will be the next American ambassador in Syria. Syria did not have an American ambassador for 5 years.
Syria welcomed Ahmedinajad's long visit to Damascus few days after this announcement. Both Ahmedinajad and al-Assad held a joint press conference in Damascus announcing the "New Middle East" as defined by both Iran and Syria. A celebration of a regional alliance that is based on mutual interests and the stability of the region. Stability understood as friendly regimes in Lebanon and Iraq, increased nuclear capability in Iran balancing that of Israel, and an increasing role for both Iran and Turkey as regional power brokers.
Nothing is wrong with this picture except for the fact that US foreign policy is not up to speed with the regional counter reaction to its mid-east policy since 2003. The basic message of the recent Iranian Syrian alliance parade is that the rules have changed in this region. American mid east hegemony is declining as far as the ability of the U.S. to exert control over international outcomes and patterns of inter/intra state behaviour. Yet, U.S. foreign policy makers are criticizing, reacting and denouncing as if we are in the 1990s. Nationalism, the revolutionary style, is making a comeback with a distinctive Moussadigh ring. A part from earlier revolutionary versions such as pan -Arabism or Islamic Caliphate, which were guided by ideologies, this regional resistance front is guided by regional interests, with security, regional and economic stability at the forefront. A united front that does not hesitate to announce with pride its alliance with Hezbollah and Hamas.
The article by former U.S. ambassador to Morocco at the Huffington post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-marc-ginsberg/kissing-cousins-assad-han_b_476585.html is a clear example of the debilitating detachment from regional reality expressed by American officials. If the only reaction to such alliance is to encourage Israeli and American strikes or to play on minority (ethnic or religious) cards and the threat of potential internal unrest in both Iran and Syria, then my fear is intellectual bankruptcy on this side of the Atlantic.
Syria is not shackled to Iran. Syria is getting a great payoff from its relations with Iran. Cheap oil, scores of Iranian tourists, trade relations, strategic defence agreements, military capabilities..etc. A U.S. foreign policy focused on detangling this relation is a waste of time if it does not include the return of the Golan Heights, all of the Golan without Israeli sovereignty detracting security stations and /or military posts, and regrettably accepting a nuclear Iran. A U.S. foreign policy that ...... (this space was designated to say something about the Israeli Palestinian ordeal, but what's the point).
Hmmm, now thinking about it...Accepting a nuclear Iran could make an Arab Israeli deal a possibility. For one, Israel military power is relatively balanced by that of Iran. Negotiation leverage is tilted towards the Palestinian and Syrian side. Israeli military strikes will be regionally scrutinized. In addition to having an upperhand on Gulf politics. Actually a deal could be struck were by the U.S. could have a say in the "how" of Iranian nuclear developments and secure strategic agreements with the Iranian regime in order to secure nuclear facilities.
Another option would be to declare war on Iran as advocated by recent war rallying cries in the Washington post and NYT. Another option is to work really hard on destabilizing Iran from the inside. There are the Arab Sunni population in the south who have numerous grievances against the Iranian regime.. there are the Iranian Kurds in the north east and of course Alqaida in the Khurasan region. And maybe the U.S. can get Iran to follow the Pakistani scenario, with military coups, nuclear capabilities, civil unrest, ethnic and religious divisions and put additional strains on an already struggling civil society.
I will try to think about a fourth option.
Meanwhile, knowing that he still has to be confirmed by the senate.. I would like to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Robert Ford to Damascus. Syria is a happening place!
Syria welcomed Ahmedinajad's long visit to Damascus few days after this announcement. Both Ahmedinajad and al-Assad held a joint press conference in Damascus announcing the "New Middle East" as defined by both Iran and Syria. A celebration of a regional alliance that is based on mutual interests and the stability of the region. Stability understood as friendly regimes in Lebanon and Iraq, increased nuclear capability in Iran balancing that of Israel, and an increasing role for both Iran and Turkey as regional power brokers.
Nothing is wrong with this picture except for the fact that US foreign policy is not up to speed with the regional counter reaction to its mid-east policy since 2003. The basic message of the recent Iranian Syrian alliance parade is that the rules have changed in this region. American mid east hegemony is declining as far as the ability of the U.S. to exert control over international outcomes and patterns of inter/intra state behaviour. Yet, U.S. foreign policy makers are criticizing, reacting and denouncing as if we are in the 1990s. Nationalism, the revolutionary style, is making a comeback with a distinctive Moussadigh ring. A part from earlier revolutionary versions such as pan -Arabism or Islamic Caliphate, which were guided by ideologies, this regional resistance front is guided by regional interests, with security, regional and economic stability at the forefront. A united front that does not hesitate to announce with pride its alliance with Hezbollah and Hamas.
The article by former U.S. ambassador to Morocco at the Huffington post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-marc-ginsberg/kissing-cousins-assad-han_b_476585.html is a clear example of the debilitating detachment from regional reality expressed by American officials. If the only reaction to such alliance is to encourage Israeli and American strikes or to play on minority (ethnic or religious) cards and the threat of potential internal unrest in both Iran and Syria, then my fear is intellectual bankruptcy on this side of the Atlantic.
Syria is not shackled to Iran. Syria is getting a great payoff from its relations with Iran. Cheap oil, scores of Iranian tourists, trade relations, strategic defence agreements, military capabilities..etc. A U.S. foreign policy focused on detangling this relation is a waste of time if it does not include the return of the Golan Heights, all of the Golan without Israeli sovereignty detracting security stations and /or military posts, and regrettably accepting a nuclear Iran. A U.S. foreign policy that ...... (this space was designated to say something about the Israeli Palestinian ordeal, but what's the point).
Hmmm, now thinking about it...Accepting a nuclear Iran could make an Arab Israeli deal a possibility. For one, Israel military power is relatively balanced by that of Iran. Negotiation leverage is tilted towards the Palestinian and Syrian side. Israeli military strikes will be regionally scrutinized. In addition to having an upperhand on Gulf politics. Actually a deal could be struck were by the U.S. could have a say in the "how" of Iranian nuclear developments and secure strategic agreements with the Iranian regime in order to secure nuclear facilities.
Another option would be to declare war on Iran as advocated by recent war rallying cries in the Washington post and NYT. Another option is to work really hard on destabilizing Iran from the inside. There are the Arab Sunni population in the south who have numerous grievances against the Iranian regime.. there are the Iranian Kurds in the north east and of course Alqaida in the Khurasan region. And maybe the U.S. can get Iran to follow the Pakistani scenario, with military coups, nuclear capabilities, civil unrest, ethnic and religious divisions and put additional strains on an already struggling civil society.
I will try to think about a fourth option.
Meanwhile, knowing that he still has to be confirmed by the senate.. I would like to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Robert Ford to Damascus. Syria is a happening place!
Sunday, January 10, 2010
A Sobering (Re)assessment
There used to be a fundamental contrast between those who solely advocate the ideals of freedom and democracy in the Middle East by means of US and western intervention, and those who account for realities and contingencies on the ground. This contrast/rift is getting fuzzy with president Obama’s second year in office.
Advocating abstract ideals in general relieves the activists/policy maker initially from attending to questions about specifics. For example: Dictators are evil, Freedom and Democracy must prevail. Would anyone disagree? Certainly not. With an element of nobility and a handful of ethical shimmer, this call for light to the dark quarters of the world has a wide audience and willing supporters. Is your intended target ready for prime time enlightenment? That becomes an unnecessary question since the act of “voting” is documented by inked thumbs, or overworked donkeys traveling uncharted roots carrying ballot boxes. White man saved brown man, yet again.
Furthermore, the idealist abstraction becomes a nice broad umbrella that can shade all sorts of national and security objectives while eliminating a tyrant. (No comment on Afghanistan, except for: al-Qaida is and was our target why on earth did we end up fighting the Taliban and their extended families, friends and emerging Taliban tribal allies all over Afghanistan and Pakistan? I have faith in Iraqis being able to work the democratic system to the benefit of Iraq).
Back to the contrast/rift. On the other side are equally committed supporters of Democracy and Freedom in the Middle East but who argue that the advancement of civil society should be propelled from within. There are numerous indigenous routes for reform: elite negotiation, growing civil society..etc. . There is no instant gratification and the process might take decades. Democratization will not live up to its true colors unless it is woven, articulated and sustained from within. Lebanon, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, imperfect as they are to us in the western hemisphere, are striving towards accommodating their respective growing civil society; and adjusting to their respective norms. The problem with imposed “western freedom and democracy agendas" is that they create a regional top-down backlash which in turn defeats the efforts of democracy activists and civil society in the region
The domestic pressure on President Obama, Health care initiative/bill and struggling economy, will squeeze him into a corner on the Foreign Policy front, precisely into the comforts of abstractions and broad “easy on the ear” agendas. Nothing is more soothing then talking about freedom and democracy in the Middle East, even the “War on Terror” is making a comeback, it soothes ears, boiling think tanks, agitated political opponents.. the list goes on. The implication of resorting to such a strategy is precisely the fuzziness it creates. So are we, when it comes to the Middle East, going to sing the tunes of the “New Middle East” and Creative Chaos again? Who knows. The question becomes is president Obama trying to decorate a pragmatist approach to foreign policy with idealist sound bites to appease domestic political opponents? Or is his Foreign Policy experiencing a fundamental shift at the core?
Advocating abstract ideals in general relieves the activists/policy maker initially from attending to questions about specifics. For example: Dictators are evil, Freedom and Democracy must prevail. Would anyone disagree? Certainly not. With an element of nobility and a handful of ethical shimmer, this call for light to the dark quarters of the world has a wide audience and willing supporters. Is your intended target ready for prime time enlightenment? That becomes an unnecessary question since the act of “voting” is documented by inked thumbs, or overworked donkeys traveling uncharted roots carrying ballot boxes. White man saved brown man, yet again.
Furthermore, the idealist abstraction becomes a nice broad umbrella that can shade all sorts of national and security objectives while eliminating a tyrant. (No comment on Afghanistan, except for: al-Qaida is and was our target why on earth did we end up fighting the Taliban and their extended families, friends and emerging Taliban tribal allies all over Afghanistan and Pakistan? I have faith in Iraqis being able to work the democratic system to the benefit of Iraq).
Back to the contrast/rift. On the other side are equally committed supporters of Democracy and Freedom in the Middle East but who argue that the advancement of civil society should be propelled from within. There are numerous indigenous routes for reform: elite negotiation, growing civil society..etc. . There is no instant gratification and the process might take decades. Democratization will not live up to its true colors unless it is woven, articulated and sustained from within. Lebanon, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, imperfect as they are to us in the western hemisphere, are striving towards accommodating their respective growing civil society; and adjusting to their respective norms. The problem with imposed “western freedom and democracy agendas" is that they create a regional top-down backlash which in turn defeats the efforts of democracy activists and civil society in the region
The domestic pressure on President Obama, Health care initiative/bill and struggling economy, will squeeze him into a corner on the Foreign Policy front, precisely into the comforts of abstractions and broad “easy on the ear” agendas. Nothing is more soothing then talking about freedom and democracy in the Middle East, even the “War on Terror” is making a comeback, it soothes ears, boiling think tanks, agitated political opponents.. the list goes on. The implication of resorting to such a strategy is precisely the fuzziness it creates. So are we, when it comes to the Middle East, going to sing the tunes of the “New Middle East” and Creative Chaos again? Who knows. The question becomes is president Obama trying to decorate a pragmatist approach to foreign policy with idealist sound bites to appease domestic political opponents? Or is his Foreign Policy experiencing a fundamental shift at the core?
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Harriri in Damascus.. Should not Surprise US
If 2009 was a good year for president Bashar al-Assad, Saad Harriri’s visit to Damascus on Sat. Dec 19th must have topped the Syrian cake with a big cherry. This visit by the Lebanese head of government to Damascus coincides with Lebanese President Suleiman’s visit to Washington. President Suleiman has a tough sales pitch for President Obama on Mon Dec 21st, he wants the U.S. to provide military aid to the Lebanese army and to nullify 1559 UN resolution sighting that Hezbollah arms issue is to be discussed only within a national forum, and please take note President Obama: everything is cool with Syria.
The fast track improvement in the Syrian Lebanese relations started with the end of summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel’s military objectives did not materialize; Hezbollah declared a victory. Consequently, Hezbollah’s political agenda was handed a much needed boost after winning 35 seats in the May 2005 elections. The inherent weaknesses of the Seniora government started to unfold in 2007 and 2008 ending with a siege on the Lebanese Parliament staged by Hezbollah coalition supporters. This troubled period ended when the Doha Agreement in May 2008 handed the Hezbollah coalition a number of concessions changing the parliament configuration from 50+1 to a third and two thirds. Furthermore, the Doha agreement handed Hezbollah coalition a veto over every government decision.
From the Syrian perspective, having friendly Lebanese officials in office is a matter of security and stability in the region President Suleiman made a visit to Damascus this past month after a number of Lebanese officials made the same trip in hopes of paving the way for normalized relations. One contentious element remained, and Harriri’s visit to Damascus yesterday marked the quintessential tipping point. In all, one can clearly see in this past year that Syrian preference dictated how and when this bilateral relation should proceed.
In contrast to what some observers would like to project on the dynamics of the region, the Syrian Lebanese relations are not tied to the equation of Syrian military presence, but are rather subject to the equation of a big authoritative, consolidated state and the factional interests of a small state suffering from identity crises. The Lebanese cannot escape geopolitics, a reality that is understood by the Christian Lebanese partners of Hezbollah and its prominent Maronite, General Aoun. It is refreshing to see that Sunni Lebanese are getting the message as well.
One hopes that this visit is indeed a step forward in the stability and prosperity of Lebanon.
The fast track improvement in the Syrian Lebanese relations started with the end of summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel’s military objectives did not materialize; Hezbollah declared a victory. Consequently, Hezbollah’s political agenda was handed a much needed boost after winning 35 seats in the May 2005 elections. The inherent weaknesses of the Seniora government started to unfold in 2007 and 2008 ending with a siege on the Lebanese Parliament staged by Hezbollah coalition supporters. This troubled period ended when the Doha Agreement in May 2008 handed the Hezbollah coalition a number of concessions changing the parliament configuration from 50+1 to a third and two thirds. Furthermore, the Doha agreement handed Hezbollah coalition a veto over every government decision.
From the Syrian perspective, having friendly Lebanese officials in office is a matter of security and stability in the region President Suleiman made a visit to Damascus this past month after a number of Lebanese officials made the same trip in hopes of paving the way for normalized relations. One contentious element remained, and Harriri’s visit to Damascus yesterday marked the quintessential tipping point. In all, one can clearly see in this past year that Syrian preference dictated how and when this bilateral relation should proceed.
In contrast to what some observers would like to project on the dynamics of the region, the Syrian Lebanese relations are not tied to the equation of Syrian military presence, but are rather subject to the equation of a big authoritative, consolidated state and the factional interests of a small state suffering from identity crises. The Lebanese cannot escape geopolitics, a reality that is understood by the Christian Lebanese partners of Hezbollah and its prominent Maronite, General Aoun. It is refreshing to see that Sunni Lebanese are getting the message as well.
One hopes that this visit is indeed a step forward in the stability and prosperity of Lebanon.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
The Price of Not Making Peace: Israel is loosing its Appeal
Syria substituted the Israeli gateway to better relations with the U.S., by improving Syria's relations with pro U.S. countries like the EU, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in 2009. Meanwhile, the Syrians have left the door open for further unofficial peace negotiations with Israel, while responding to Israeli military preparations with a joint defense strategy with Iran.
Luring Syria away from Iran is highly unlikely with shy friendly nudges from the U.S. every now and then and without concrete advancements on the Syrian Israeli peace track. Advancements that are hard to commit to by the Israeli side since they involve the occupied Golan Heights.
Not committing to a comprehensive peace with its Arab neighbors, Israel is loosing its high tech edge to China, India, Turkey, EU who are increasing the number of trade agreements with Arab countries. The economic losses for Israel resulting from forgone high tech contracts could easily amount to a considerable sum, not to mention agricultural and low grade industry trade. Israeli high tech comparative advantage will slowly diminish not because Arab countries will catch up to Israel’s technological level but because there are numerous and ever increasing providers for high tech trade deals.
The liability of Israel threatening military strikes every now and then is burdening the leverage of U.S. diplomats who are involved in Mideast peace tracks. Furthermore the impact of such threats ( a trend since 2006) amounts to temporal political pressure which will detract from the good will established in prior unofficial peace talks in recent month.
Not committing to Peace has a high price
Luring Syria away from Iran is highly unlikely with shy friendly nudges from the U.S. every now and then and without concrete advancements on the Syrian Israeli peace track. Advancements that are hard to commit to by the Israeli side since they involve the occupied Golan Heights.
Not committing to a comprehensive peace with its Arab neighbors, Israel is loosing its high tech edge to China, India, Turkey, EU who are increasing the number of trade agreements with Arab countries. The economic losses for Israel resulting from forgone high tech contracts could easily amount to a considerable sum, not to mention agricultural and low grade industry trade. Israeli high tech comparative advantage will slowly diminish not because Arab countries will catch up to Israel’s technological level but because there are numerous and ever increasing providers for high tech trade deals.
The liability of Israel threatening military strikes every now and then is burdening the leverage of U.S. diplomats who are involved in Mideast peace tracks. Furthermore the impact of such threats ( a trend since 2006) amounts to temporal political pressure which will detract from the good will established in prior unofficial peace talks in recent month.
Not committing to Peace has a high price
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)